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Since the Endangered Species Act was passedin 1973, there have been approximately 514animal species listed. Of those, at least 258
are aquatic species or aquatic dependant species.
As one would expect, the ranges, distributions, and
ecological needs of many of these species overlap.
Also, due to changes in the physical environment,
species have been significantly restricted to a
fraction of their former range; some even may now
reside where they historically had not. As a result,
there may be significant conflict between the varying
needs of different listed species now restricted to
the same limited areas, often outside the preferred
range of at least one of the species; these conflicts
are further complicated when the areas involved are
critically important for societal needs. However,
science provides us with valuable tools to help
manage these conflicts. This paper will hopefully
illustrate the application (or lack of application) of
these tools in the management of several such
conflicts.
Chinook Salmon
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA
Fisheries) listed winter-run chinook salmon in the
Sacramento River in the Central Valley of California
as a threatened species in 1990 (subsequently
reclassified as endangered in 1995). Winter-run
chinook historically began their spawning run up the
Sacramento River in December and continued
through June. Spawning would occur typically in
April through July. Rearing and out-migration would
continue throughout the spawning period on spring
flows. Prior to the construction of Shasta Dam on
the upper Sacramento River, winter-run chinook
would go past the present dam site into the upper
Sacramento, Pit, and McCloud Rivers. The glacial
melt that stimulated spawning would also keep the
temperature of the water in the rivers very cool,
providing optimal rearing conditions. This race of
chinook salmon became adapted to this ecological
niche.
When Shasta Dam, and its reregulating reservoir
downstream (controlled by Keswick dam), were
built no provision for upstream passage by salmon
was provided. Winter-run chinook salmon were
effectively precluded from virtually all the historical
spawning habitat that had been upstream of
Keswick. The construction of Red Bluff Diversion
Dam, approximately 30 miles downstream of
Keswick, which provides irrigation supply to the
Tehama Colusa Canal, further precluded upstream
passage by salmon. Faced with these extreme
changes to the river system in which they evolved,
it is perhaps suprising that winter-run chinook salmon
were not extirpated soon after construction of Shasta,
Keswick, and Red Bluff dams. However, Shasta
Dam was regularly operated for hydropower
production which meant that water was released at
an elevation on the dam to accommodate the
turbines. When the reservoir was full these releases
were cold and created suitable downstream
environmental conditions for winter-run chinook
salmon spawning and rearing; winter-run chinook
salmon were soon observed using new spawning
habitat below Keswick Dam. Unfortunately the dam
was not always full. When the reservoir was low
the releases were warm, creating adverse conditions
for winter-run chinook salmon. This series of
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physical changes to the environment “forced” the
winter-run chinook salmonout of its historical range
and straight into the path of water development in
the Central Valley of California.
The listing of winter-run chinook salmon was
determined appropriate because the population of
spawning adults returning to the river had declined
from over 100,000 individuals in the late 1960s to
less than 200 at the time of listing. Additionally,
NOAA Fisheries concluded that the continued
operation of the Central Valley Project, specifically
Shasta Dam and Red Bluff Diversion Dam were
significant threats to the species.
Delta Smelt
At the lower end of the Sacramento Valley, in the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (hereafter Delta),
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the delta
smelt as a threatened species in 1993. The delta
smelt is a small, mostly annual fish that resides in
the Delta, Suisun Bay, and Suisun Marsh. Historically,
this species began its spawning migration from
Suisun Bay as early as February and continued
through April and early May. Spawning occurred
from March through May but could have been as
late as mid-June in drier years. The species has a
very narrow salinity tolerance. Historically, the
appropriate salinity range moved over a relatively
broad geographic extent and was controlled by the
amount of spring outflow.
The Delta is the location where state and federal
water projects divert water to agricultural and
municipal purposes in the San Joaquin Valley and
Southern California. The Federal Central Valley
Project (CVP) began diverting from the Delta in
1939. The State Water Project (SWP) began
diverting from the Delta in 1968. Combined they
diverted as much as 70% of the inflow into the Delta,
up to 6.1 million acre feet annually. These two water
projects modified the physical environment in two
principle ways related to the delta smelt. First was
the construction of the dams themselves. The Central
Valley is a spring snowmelt system. Historically the
rivers peaked in flow in April and May as the Sierra
snowmelt occurred; the dams were developed to
capture the snowmelt for water supply and thereby
prevent it from arriving in the Delta. In addition, the
export pumps significantly affected habitat conditions
in the Delta itself. The diverted fresh water was
replaced in the Delta by higher salinity water from
the Bay. This resulted in a constriction of suitable
habitat based on salinity.
These examples highlight how the physical
changes to this system have affected these two
species, and increased the potential for conflict both
between the two species and between the species
and California’s water supply needs. Prior to water
development there would have been no potential
conflict between these species’ life histories. Now,
however, both species depend on timely releases
from Shasta Dam—at times which don’t always
match up, and may not be consistent with the
seasonal needs of California’s agricultural and urban
water users. The essence of the potential conflict
was the tension between releasing water for Delta
water quality and retaining water for temperature
management. This is a situation that is not just
confined to the upper Sacramento River but exists
for all major tributaries to the Sacramento and San
Joaquin rivers and for many other runs of salmon in
the Central Valley.
There was a substantial amount known about
these species at the time of their listing, including
some knowledge of the ecological functions and
physical habitat characteristics necessary for their
survival. However, for the many years during their
decline, prior to protection under the ESA, there was
very little targeted monitoring and evaluation of them.
Additionally, there was very little done in a proactive
manner prior to listing to modify the physical threats
to the species in order to preclude listing, even though
all of the signs were present. Even following their
listing, true adaptive management and monitoring
programs were not established for winter-run smelt
for about a decade and about 4 to 5 years for delta
smelt. Only now are we truly reaping the benefits
of additional knowledge on how to manage this
system for the species while providing for the
purposes of the water project with a higher degree
of certainty.
Some very significant interruptions in project
operations due to listed species issues forced people
to the table to evaluate the scientific capabilities in
order to refine management around real time data.
Significant reductions in pumping and water supply
deliveries coupled with critical habitat designations,
additional species listings, and new water quality
standards for the Delta, largely developed around
the needs of the fish, galvanized the Valley’s
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motivation to come to the table. It was the Bay-
Delta Accord (signed in 1994), which launched the
CalFED Bay-Delta Program in 1995. CalFED has
not attained true adaptive management yet because
the essence of adaptive management is determining
the uncertainties and then designing focused
experiments to resolve the uncertainties. CalFED
has implemented only a few experiments. Part of
the uncertainty that agencies and stakeholders had
to wrestle with was: If you managed temperature
for winter-run through the summer would you
sufficiently deplete available storage thereby risking
spring salinity management in the Delta? The flip
side of this is that water would be released from
storage to meet water quality standards, depleting
the cold water pool in the reservoir. CalFED is very
early in implementing its “experiment” and only time
will tell whether sufficient momentum has been
gained to reverse the trends for these species. Early
results appear very promising.
So where does this very brief case study lead
and what kind of implications does it have for other
similar, controversial programs such as the Platte
River Recovery Program, the Missouri River, the
Rio Grande, the Pecos? My qualitative assessment
and unscientific view of the world leads me to
conclude that despite obvious signals of ecological
and species decline, there is generally an
unwillingness to invest in structured science before
a crisis (e.g., listing a species under the ESA or some
operational constraint). This lack of advance
scientific endeavor leads to a lack of targeted long-
term data sets that in-turn creates a void of new
science and delayed knowledge once a species has
been listed. Additionally, our traditional emphasis on
species specific information and focus on minimum
requirements undermines multi-species, landscape
scale management.
In the CalFED process, as is the case in many
of these highly complex and controversial programs,
it took strong leadership from the stakeholder
community to not just talk about the lack of science
but bring resources to the table to help it along.
This does not include just funding and other
resources. Stakeholders and non-agency staff have
brought challenges to the existing paradigms and
old ways of doing business—and importantly, an
interest in jointly finding a way to operate the system
better for all its needs. This is not to say what the
agencies had been doing was wrong, but that a
willingness to collaborate for change establishes
an environment where agencies are willing to take
risks in the interest of obtaining results. As noted
by David Hayes (2002), other elements need to be
present, perhaps especially a forcing event which
creates a tipping point for people to move off of
positions and political leadership to bring parties to
the table and get results.
Another issue I have observed is that often the
evaluation that results from regulatory action
confirms the false belief that there is only one answer.
Again, through the lack of upfront information on
uncertainties, agency personnel must act on the
information they have. This often leads to a
prescriptive solution because of the lack of
information to assess alternative courses of action.
The structure of the statutes and regulations are
interpreted often as giving little flexibility to manage
in the interest of protecting the resource while
minimizing impacts. The prescriptive solution
becomes the only scientifically supportable solution,
in part because a lack of information or the presence
of conflicting information makes agency personnel
risk-averse.  In some respects this was the real time
ramification of the Klamath situation.
The Klamath is a situation again where multiple
species are involved (suckers in the upper basin and
salmon in the lower basin) and where science is
less than complete despite the fact the suckers in
the upper basin have been listed under the ESA since
1988 and coho salmon since 1997.  The endangered
Lost River sucker and the short-nosed sucker reside
in Upper Klamath Lake and upstream portions of
the watershed. Downstream of Upper Klamath Lake
reside the threatened coho salmon. The suckers of
Upper Klamath Lake have suffered significant
mortality events for which the specific causes are
unclear. There is a certain body of data that indicates
poor water quality has occurred in Upper Klamath
Lake, but not necessarily at the same time as the
mortality events. Coho salmon utilize both the
mainstem and the tributaries of the Klamath River
but at different times of the year. The Service and
NOAA Fisheries came to the independent
conclusions that sucker survival depends on non-
dramatic changes in the lake level and that there
should be minimum instream flows for coho salmon
to ensure their survival. These decisions, coupled
with the natural event of drought set a recipe for
disaster in the summer of 2001.
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The ESA does not provide for the Service or
NOAA Fisheries to not act pending additional
information. They are charged with making decisions
based on the information at hand. The lack of
precision in the science often leads the agencies to
choose conservative alternatives with relatively little
flexibility. A result is that there is little room to
maneuver or find creative solutions when a crisis
hits. The results of the agencies’ evaluation becomes
“the” answer. Advanced scientific knowledge would
have provided the agencies more guidance on where
flexibility lies and how to formulate an adaptive
management program that would resolve some of
the remaining uncertainties in the Klamath Basin.
The National Research Council (National
Research Council 2004) evaluated the science
behind the decisions of the agencies in the Klamath
basin and concluded that the vast majority of those
decisions were appropriate and that exercise of
judgment was not outside the bounds of scientific
knowledge. However, they did conclude that in
certain instances that there was a lack of clear
science to justify the decision. In fact, they concluded
that there may actually be data that would be counter
to the conclusions reached by the agency. The NRC
concluded that a basin wide effort of recovery
implementation and participation by others in the
basin was essential for success. Implicit in these
conclusions, and discussions early in the report about
the lack of data, leads me to think that a more
collaborative process initiated earlier may have
avoided this crisis.
The current Missouri River situation illustrates a
similar path. The Missouri River is currently home
to three listed species: Interior least terns, Great
Plains piping plovers, and pallid sturgeon. The
Missouri River traverses seven states in the central
plains of the U.S. There happens to be fairly good
information on population status and trends across
the range of the piping plover. However, there is no
range-wide or basin-wide coordinated scientific
effort to evaluate and manage the least tern or the
pallid sturgeon. The Missouri River was historically,
and to a certain degree currently is, a highly dynamic
system. The three species, as well as numerous
other native species in the basin, have principally
suffered and declined because of the loss of physical
form and function of the river. There appears to be
little debate on this point. However, because of the
lack of a comprehensive scientific study of the basin,
there is currently no agreement on precisely how
much of that form and function must be returned to
the river to stem the decline of these species,
especially the pallid sturgeon.
The Service took the position in 2000 that some
semblance of form and function needs to be restored
to the Missouri River in order to ensure the survival
of these species. As a result the Service prescribed
an approach. In 2003, the Service was again asked
to reconsider its approach. The Service continued
to conclude in 2003 that some semblance of form
and function needed to be restored to the Missouri
River to ensure the survival of the pallid sturgeon.
The Service did, however, modify the specific
measures required. There was substantial litigation
associated with this issue. The essential arguments
were: 1) there is insufficient science to do anything,
2) the science is so clear that the Service should
have never deviated from their original conclusion.
The court ultimately decided that the basic course
laid out at the end of 2003 was defensible. Despite
years of conflict in the basin and in the courts I offer
that we are not much better off in our understanding
of what works and what does not work ecologically
in the Missouri River. Although the courts have ruled
on the basic framework, to ensure success for all
interests it takes leadership and people collaborating
on the science; both appear to be lacking in the basin.
Despite a long history of conflict there has, as
yet, not been sufficient coalescence around dedicating
the resources to implement a comprehensive
monitoring and adaptive management program. Even
after 2000, when there could have been a tipping
point, there was only further polarization that yielded
very little new information that the Service could
evaluate in 2003. Even with judicial resolution of the
legal questions there will have to be leadership at
the affected parties’ table to work out a practical
and (biologically and socially) supportable solution.
Recently, in trying to comply with one component of
the biological opinion, the Army Corps of Engineers
proposed to construct an unprecedented amount of
shallow water habitat in the Missouri River. Their
basic premise was to springboard off work that had
been done since the mid-1970s. Remarkably, after
35 years of implementation, there was very little
empirical data that indicated the reliability or efficacy
of the course chosen by the Corps. Therefore, there
remains great uncertainty as to the degree of impact
that the Corps’ recent actions will have on the
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biological environment. Only with dedicated adaptive
management and monitoring will we be able to
remove some of the uncertainties and maximize
biological benefits.
In conclusion, I glean the following lessons from
the past to help guide the future. First, there are
numerous species that are in decline and are
considered to be candidates for protection under the
ESA. Many of these are already in areas where
other species are currently afforded protection and
for which management is currently being applied.
There may well be very little structured science being
conducted to evaluate what may be the conservation
needs of these candidate species and the possibility
of incorporating those needs into the management
for species that are already protected. The more
upfront work, at the system-wide level, that is done
now the more flexibility will be available later
because of the knowledge developed. However,
there may be sufficient information now to develop
starting points for actions, within an adaptive
management framework, to avoid crisis. An advance
on investment, in terms of money, human resources,
and collaborative processes may likely save money
and resources in the long-term.
Secondly, those agencies and stakeholders that
are involved in these highly complex issues must
choose to deviate from positional and advocacy
science into a collaborative process to develop viable
adaptive management programs. Only through
collaboration will there be certainty for all sides. This
will require that agencies assume some short-term
risk for long-term gains in knowledge and
management flexibility. For stakeholder communities,
it requires that they assume some risk of short-term
impacts in order to establish longer-term
management flexibility and stability.
Third, in order to have a sustainable and defensible
process and outcome, the development of adaptive
management programs must be transparent and
subject to outside review. Only through ownership
and understanding will all the parties accept and
support the results. Progress can be made as long
as people are focused on interpreting results that
flow from an agreed upon program. If there is
suspicion because the program was developed with
a smaller subset of the community, certain interests
will want to focus on why or how results were
obtained, rather than focusing on the results
themselves. If done properly, outside independent
review will validate the program and insulate and
defend against the extremes. Independent outside
review gives any interest in the process the
legitimacy to force change if the science is supported.
Lastly, science should focus on mechanisms and
ecological processes leading to desired outcomes,
rather than setting precise criteria. Knowing what
you want to achieve and the mechanisms (physical
or chemical processes, etc.) that are relevant to the
objectives allows for a reasonable starting point from
which to assess and manage change. By establishing
this type of approach, agencies and stakeholders can
react to unusual circumstances without violating the
boundaries of the regulatory construct. It is also an
admission that we probably don’t know enough
about these large systems to give the definitive
answer today or even tomorrow. The bottom line,
from the agency perspective, is that decisions must
be made and starting points must be established.
Other interested parties must be assured that the
starting points are reasonable and that agencies will
respond to information, even if it means moving away
from prior established positions.
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